

Latest Developments in Saudi Arabia and their Internal and Regional Consequences on the Palestinian Cause.

By Omar Shaban

First: the crisis developments

The region is living in a state of suspension and anticipation due to the steady, political changes and developments Saudi Arabia has undergone since King Salman assumed the throne. There is an attempt to rebuild the political system in the kingdom to ensure the establishment of the Emir and the rising crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman's role. Besides, the regime has made huge and successive changes; all of them are mostly directed towards the focus of security, economic, and religious power in the hands of the newly appointed crown prince.

At both political and security levels, Prince Mohammed bin Salman was appointed Defense Minister as soon as his father took over. Subsequently, the former Crown Prince, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, was removed from the Covenant and from the leadership of the Interior Ministry. Finally, Prince Mutaib bin Abdul Aziz was dismissed from the presidency of the National Guard since he was a possible rival of Mohammed bin Salman on the crown prince, who thus dominated the leadership of the main security institutions in the kingdom: the army, the National Guard, and the Interior, without rivaling influential princess from the ruling family.

On the economic front, Prince Mohammed bin Salman was appointed Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, which controls Aramco, the giant oil company

that deals with a third of the world's oil reserves. At the end of last year, Bin Salman launched what he called "2030" as a strategic vision for Saudi Arabia. In addition, more than 200 Saudi emir and businessmen were arrested in corruption cases. More than 100 billion dollars in reserves were seized, according to the Saudi Attorney General. Furthermore, the detainees have a number of the most pioneer Arab media outlets, such as Arabic and Rutana channels. Hence, this will place more economic and media power in the hands of the Crown Prince.

On the religious level, dozens of influential preachers and sheikhs were arrested. Also, the religious police, "Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice" was stripped of their power in arresting citizens without a prior parliamentary order. Moreover, extensive cultural changes have been launched, including women's right to drive, and popular celebrations of national holidays and entertainment.

The above-mentioned changes even spread to regional parties. To illustrate, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri submitted his resignation, which as many argued was a result of Saudi pressure. In addition, the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, was called to Riyadh urgently. Attitudes continue to appear between US backing for the Crown Prince's actions and a European protest over Saudi moves, which could hit Paris and Berlin. This has created suspicions

that the anti-corruption campaign is not only an internal affair, in order to actually fight corruption, or to prove the ruling pillars of the rising prince, but beyond that, it could be part of steps to create the environment for future regional changes. The Saudi economy is facing a difficult privatization challenge. Outside, the Kingdom faces a prolonged war in Yemen, a crisis in the Gulf with Qatar, intense, regional rivalry with Iran, and a security challenge with militant groups.

Second: the causes of the crisis

Developments in Saudi Arabia in the presence of different internal and external challenges lead to searching for the causes and motives of the crisis.

1.The internal causes and motives of the crisis

- Reconfiguration the features of the new power's map and the kingdom's wealth and the DE concentration of power in the hands of the Saudi Crown Prince. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia no longer wants to keep its self-preservation and its leading for Saudi state in the same way it did previously. Noticeably, there is a major transformation, approaching an absolute monarchy or let's say a fourth Saudi state in which the traditional loyalty of Al Saud family goes to Al Salman.
- The elimination of political forces and their concentration in the King's hands, overcoming some of the Crown Prince's opponents and his rivals within the royal family itself, anticipating their mobilization against him, prosecuting those who confront, or obstruct, or threaten his rule, disposing of the religious authority and concentrating it in the king's hands while reducing the influence of religious institutions and sectors and even the effect of the conservative clerics to move from one religious reality to another . By this, they would be able to implement religious reforms that bring the kingdom back to moderate Islam and make Saudi Arabia less politicized in order to consolidate the governance, eliminate the centers of

financial forces, and recruit the businessmen's funds needed to implement the vision of 2030. 2030 vision includes establishing a huge city called "Nyum" in the North-West of the kingdom that is worth of 500 billion \$ in order to show that his style of leadership is the best way forward.

- Introducing the Saudi landscape for the privatization of Aramco. This is partly due to the reality that many of the royal family's members and the old guard have made up a wealth of Saudi Aramco payments. It means they would have opposed his steps which would have negatively affected his economic plans and his reputation as a ruler who is unable to fulfill his promises. At large, this helps the Crown Prince gain international support, especially the United States' for his role's stabilization since the US president explicitly has asked Saudi Arabia to privatize Aramco.

2.External causes of the crisis

- Facing Iran's expansion in the region: The kingdom finds how it is surrounded by dangers and threats, started by the US-Iranian relationship that led to a nuclear agreement, a US retreat from change in Syria with reinforcing the Iranian influence there, as well as a fierce conflict with Iran, which controls four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and San'a, and its allies. In addition, the Houthi rocket attack on Riyadh exacerbated the conflict and revealed Iran's transition to a direct strike strategy rather than a strategy of encircling the Gulf by controlling the waterways in the Strait of Hormuz in the Arabian Gulf. It also seeks controlling Bab al-Mandab Strait in the Red Sea which affects transferring Petrol and energy from the Gulf to Europe, America, and Asia.

- Facing the Muslim Brotherhood's Thought: There is a Saudi belief that considers implementing religious reforms will counter the Muslim Brotherhood's perspective and its impact on the Arab socio-political context. It considers the politicization led by Islamists has long been detrimental to the natural dialogue on the Palestinian-Israeli issue, perpetuating the tragedy of the Palestinians while portraying Israel as the devil. Thus, it created a social sphere that generates conspiracy theories and it jeopardizes the stability of Saudi Arabia and of the region. This achieves two objectives: to prepare the Saudi and the Arab public opinion for rapprochement with Israel on the one hand, and to counter the Turkish-Qatari expansion by addressing the political Islam groups associated with their regional project.

Third: Crisis Scenarios

It is true that these actions and measures were welcomed by large sections of the new generation, particularly after the Crown Prince announced that their goal is to tackle corruption, return to real, moderate Islam, and achieve social reforms. However, they are still facing opposition from large sectors of both conservative and civil forces for they affect their interests and influence. This increases the possibility of repercussions presence on the top issues in the region, especially since the relationship are no longer governed by the same family considerations or previous balances. Moreover, political positions on regional and international issues are not identical, although they are largely compatible. Therefore, in order to understand the future of great, accelerating changes, whether they are successful or not, and their implications for the stability of the kingdom and its political system, and of the region, it is needed to recognize the possible scenarios:

Scenario 1: The internal situation in the Kingdom, which includes two scenarios:

The Crown Prince's success Scenario:

The Crown Prince may succeed in establishing a new iron rule, in which wealth and power are exclusively concentrated in the ruler's hands rather than the ruling family. Indeed, success will not be easy. The Crown Prince will have to face troublesome internal and external challenges, foremost, to revive the Saudi economy, in the context of oil prices decline. He also has to confront the consequences of the rapid cultural and religious change in the Kingdom, to achieve stable security, and to ensure that there are no internal political divisions, especially among security institutions. He has to maintain a new system based on the concentration of power, responsibility, the absence of diversity, and capable institutions of absorbing and change. At the same time, he has to manage difficult external challenges, such as the relationship with Iran, the Gulf crisis, and international relations in the post-Trump era without political or diplomatic losses that weaken his internal appearance.

The Kingdom's conflagration Scenario:

The Crown Prince's steps reflect great risks. To illustrate, Saudi Arabia is not an absolute property; it is based on very accurate and complex balances within the royal family, not outside. Furthermore, security institutions and wealth are distributed within different branches of the ruling family to ensure no one gets the power alone. They also rely on the religious institution support and on the policies of the state rent, which guarantees the loyalty of the Saudi people and their believing of the distribution of oil revenues. These balances, as built by the Founding Fathers, cause balance in power and the participation of various groups of the royal family. They, moreover, provide kind of legitimacy to the ruler; and the king is the result of this consensus around him. Nevertheless, as the

Crown Prince dismantles this long-standing structure, he reduces sources of legitimacy and focuses responsibility in his hands. By that, he increases the dissatisfaction of the opponents and a wide range of contradictions will surround him; hence, this produces weak institutions and causes huge, sudden changes. Opponents will gradually assemble themselves, and whenever they can, they will come back to counter and unseat him or even when he mostly needs his family consensus and the Kingdom's power forces. The governance transition increased the discontentment in Saudi Arabia. Bin Salman ignored the royal family objection to the arrests against powerful princes, such as Prince Mteb bin Abdullah, the former Minister of National Guard.

Scenario 2: The situation in Lebanon that leads to two scenarios

Read justment: this scenario depends on the Hezbollah and its coalition's rationality and pragmatism, as well as Iranian considerations. This approach depends on the possible concessions that could be offered by Hezbollah to build confidence; similar to the concessions previously accepted by Al-Hariri in last year's agreement. The most important of these concessions may be by the Hezbollah acceptance of the three conditions set by Prime Minister Saad Hariri to go back on resignation: „safeguarding (the Taif Agreement) and the national reconciliation premises, the actual implementation of self-restraint, and not harming the relations with the Arab countries." Through withdrawal from Syria and refraining from interfering in the Arab countries affairs, specifically Yemen and Bahrain or by accepting a totally new government in which their party will not be represented so that the Lebanese government does not constitute a cover for Hezbollah in the affairs of the region's countries.

Internal crises: based on this scenario, Hezbollah will refuse to act according to the principle of self-restraint that Hariri demands for his post as a

prime minister. The party will continue to intervene in the region's affairs as a tool of the outer, Iranian policy. This will lead to the outbreak of the crisis, the resignation of the Prime Minister again, and the refusal to return to a political partnership of Hezbollah in no way due to Hezbollah intransigence and their refusal to follow the rules of reconciliation, heading for escalation. Accordingly, several constitutional, military, and financial crises will break out because the Saudi and Gulf measures are temporarily suspended. These measures target Lebanese expatriate labor, the financial sector, and tourism. If the Kingdom succeeds in achieving this goal, it will certainly have a devastating impact on the situation inside Lebanon. This will lead to popular protests to pressure Hezbollah to return to the rules of the settlement, which could escalate into armed confrontations difficult to be overcome if Syrian refugees were armed. Bombings or political assassinations may be reproduced in Lebanon; chaos and conflict would lead to a regional and international confrontation due to the internal crisis in light of the Lebanese split and its external interactions in the regional alignment, Saudi-Iranian confrontation, and Hezbollah's regional roles' expansion and their interrelatedness with the current crisis. Afterthought, the crisis continues until the power forces are re-established in the regional arena and its repercussions on the Lebanese scene reappear.

Scenario 3: The Palestinian Issue:

Clearly, the new American vision in the region speaks of shifting from enforcing the democratization strategy on the Arab region or the Arab Spring to cooperating with the existing Arab regimes in an attempt of forming an Arab-Israeli regional hub that will deal with terrorism and Iranian expansion. This requires a settlement on the Palestinian track to save the Arabs of the embarrassment of joining it. Consequently, calling President Mahmoud Abbas to Saudi Arabia made sense for the United States with its relationship

with Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo to pressure the Palestinian side to accept the Trump Deal, which revolves around the two-state solution and the postponement of Jerusalem. It aims at the achievement of full Arab normalization between the Arabs and Israel, in exchange of generous financial aid to the Palestinian authority and a solution to the issue of refugees. It also includes an explicit Israeli demand that the Israeli army remain in the Palestinian territories and in the border areas of the Jordan Valley. Israel, based on this deal, asks for the Arab normalization with it before a full settlement with the Palestinians is achieved. It is expected that the Kingdom will supplement its efforts on the Palestinian track in implementing the Arab initiative in consultation with the Palestinian Authority as it strengthens its regional status. Furthermore, it provides a legal cover for its relationship with Israel, along with some modifications in its efforts, to form a broad, regional front to counter Iranian influence in the region and then move the situation in Lebanon. The Jordanian Kingdom fears Saudi Arabia's willingness to give up the Palestinian' right to return in exchange of Jerusalem under international sovereignty as a part of peace seal of the Middle East with Israel to facilitate a Saud-Israeli alliance to confront Iran. Jordan believes that ending the right of return will cause disorders in its kingdom for half of the Jordanian population is Palestinians. It also considers this agreement will undermine the special situation played by Jordan as a patron of Al-Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem. Saudi Arabia has expressed its willingness to raise the monthly funding of the Palestinian Authority, but demanded that Hamas give up its relations with Iran. Speaking about the Palestinian role within Lebanon if the internal situation there explodes, the required, constant Palestinian policy is self-indulgence in the Arab crises and rejection of the Palestinian presence in favor of any party, especially as the positions and perspectives of the Palestinian factions are not united; thus, any Arab or regional dispute will turn into a Palestinian civil war.

Scenario 4: Continuation to the regional conflict:

1- Saudi-Iranian conflict

Iran will not abandon its project known as the state of the crescent (Al—Helal), especially after its features began to be formed after controlling the four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana'a. Iran will continue to intervene in the rest of the Arab squares through its allies, as it leads a comprehensive Iranian attack in the region, which escalated and accelerated after the fall of the constraint that was represented by the regime of Saddam Hussein. Iran has already agreed with Syria, on the eve of the US invasion of Iraq, to prevent the establishment of a stable government in Baghdad under the US presence. The day after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, the two sides also decided to prevent the establishment of a stable government in Lebanon after the Syrian forces had to withdraw from. Iran was the main player in the depletion of Oslo agreement and what happened in Palestine. It will continue to support the Huthis in Yemen and escalate the war against Saudi Arabia. It will continue to move Shiite minorities in the Arab countries to drop what it can from the Arab states. It intervenes in Bahrain, exploits the situation in Qatar to strengthen its influence, and continues to control Hezbollah's policies and their outer interventions. Moreover, Iran continues to support some Palestinian factions as a card of its external policy. Iran clearly has no real opposition to its activities in the region, where the United States has signed a nuclear deal with it and is not seriously considering its interference in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia will continue to escalate against Iran and Hezbollah to confront the Iranian expansion, in an attempt to change the current status in Lebanon and to establish its hegemony. One of the signs of this is the resignation of Hariri and the condemnation of the Arab League Council for Iranian intervention in

the region on 19/11/2017 and demanding an emergency session of the Security Council to decide on the matter. The Kingdom will continue to participate in the framework of the regional alignment and the large campaign led by the Trump administration against Iran, supported by Israel. The kingdom continues to see Iran as a direct threat by intervening in the war in Yemen and supporting the Huthis who have escalated the war by targeting Riyadh by a ballistic missile, its control of four Arab capitals and its continued support of Shiite minorities in the Gulf states to provoke chaos.

2. The Arab-Turkish conflict

The Turkish-Qatari regional hub is monitoring the developments and managing relations with all sides, as it intersects with Iran sometimes when it comes to the Kurdish issue, and varies by it in Syria. It agrees politically with Saudi Arabia in Syria and disagrees with it in Egypt. This hub has its different project of enabling political Islam to overthrow the two parties as much as possible and controls two capitals, Doha and Khartoum, and other political groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The second is to confront the Muslim Brotherhood and their ideology in the region, and to confront the currents of political Islam affiliated with Turkey, which is striving to complete the draft access to governance in the region to achieve the Turkish project.

Scenario 5: Ongoing international engagement with regional conflicts

The international powers are taking advantage of the conflict to carry out their interests. The United States is pushing for the region to be involved in a major conflict. It is trying to form a regional alliance against Iran while at the same time running a nuclear deal with it and not taking seriously its presence in Syria and its support for the Houthis. The United States seeks to make the conflict with Iran a substitute for the traditional conflict in the region with Israel, and even an

entry into Israeli-Arab cooperation against Iran that goes beyond the Arab consensus to find a settlement to the Palestinian issue before normalizing relations with Israel according to the Arab initiative. It is also exploiting the Iranian threat to blackmail the Arabs, pass a deal for Israel and market more arms deals. In general, it can be said that the involvement of the region in the conflict of the axes will be at the expense of the Palestinian cause, and will leave the destruction, where the stability and development of the Arab region are almost lost. The United States and Israel will be the biggest winners.

Russia is exploiting conflicts in the region to achieve its interests, meeting Iran in Syria and at the same time developing its relationship with Saudi Arabia in the areas of investment in Russia, joint oil pricing and the arms trade. Russia views the region's conflicts as an opportunity for new geopolitical gains and a challenge to American hegemony in the realization of Putin's Russian vision of "developing Russia's role in a multi-polar world without the supremacy of a single superpower." The region enjoys an important geo-strategic position in the two global strategies of the Russian Federation and the United States.

Europe does not prefer the deterioration of the situation again for the waves of migration and terrorism, and the loss of influence in some squares, such as Lebanon in the event of slipping into chaos again.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the region is heading towards more disorder and escalation in light of the Turkish-Iranian rapprochement in the region, whose interests converged in two areas: Qatar, where the two countries rejected the Arab measures against Qatar and Turkey sent military forces to protect the Qatari regime. Iran provided economic support and opened its doors in the Iraqi arena, where the two countries agreed to support the central government against the Kurds after the organization of Kurdistan referendum on

secession from Iraq, for fear of the Kurds claim the two countries independence. If the relationship between the two countries develops, it will pose a direct threat to the Gulf countries through the Iranian gate and its traditional conflict with these countries, and a threat to Egypt and the rest of the region through the Turkish portal through the mobilization of political Islam groups. The confrontation will continue in the battlefields of the proxy, such as Yemen, Syria and Lebanon, and may develop into direct confrontations if new variables are introduced into the conflict environment similar to the Houthi missile that targeted Riyadh.

In the face of this open confrontation, Saudi Arabia will increase its openness to Israel and will try to push for a settlement of the Palestinian issue as a necessity to ally itself with Israel in the face of what it sees as regional threats to its security, stability and security of the entire region. Saudi Arabia will not hesitate to ignite the Lebanese arena as much as possible to alter the balance of open confrontation with Iran.

The Century Deal and Trump's Decision on Jerusalem and Possible Scenarios:

The American administration's actions and recent Trump's decisions were in a follow-up to changes and transformations. Trump administration's decision on Jerusalem has three main possibilities. The first is the administration's attempt to rally support for Israel and the Jewish Lobby in the United States in the context of continuing investigations into Russian interference in the Presidential elections. It's also simulated especially after former Trump's National Security Adviser, General Michael Flynn admitted lying in his testimony to the Commission and after the possibility of the removal of Trump based on this case. Second, as Martin Indyk says: "the decision was a temptation to the Christian and radical evangelical base." During the campaign, Trump repeatedly emphasized that he would recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and would transfer his country's embassy there. The third possibility is the preparation of his deputy's tour of the

region, which would have come to promote a final peace deal that begins with "recognition of reality; no more no less". Despite the administration's knowledge of the possible consequences of the decisions, it found support of most of its pillars except the foreign and defense ministries: they opposed.

The Palestinian, Arab, Islamic, and State responses at all levels were opposed to this resolution. In an emergency session of the UN Security Council, there was consensus that recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel contradicted the relevant UN resolutions and "does not help" bring peace to the Middle East.

The Council of the League of Arab States at the level of the Arab foreign ministers rejected the decision of the United States to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and to transfer its embassy there. It condemned this decision and considered it a wrong one and a serious breach of the international law, the resolutions of the Security Council, the relevant UN General Assembly and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the case of the separation wall.

The decisions of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) came out more clearly as the leaders of Islamic countries rejected US President Donald Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, calling it "irresponsible" and "null and void." They declared East Jerusalem the capital of the State of Palestine, and called all states to recognize the State of Palestine and the occupied East Jerusalem as its capital. The resolution was considered "a declaration of the US administration's withdrawal from its role as an intermediary in the care and realization of peace between the parties." Furthermore, President Erdogan called for a new mediator in the peace process as an alternative to the United States. The leaders of Islamic countries considered the resolution an encouraging to Israel, the occupying power. They added if the UN Security Council did not take any action regarding Jerusalem, they would be ready to bring the issue to the General Assembly of the United Nations."

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said that the Palestinian leadership no longer accepts the United

States as a mediator for the peace process, stressing that the state of Palestine will demand that the Security Council revoke US President Donald Trump's decision on Jerusalem. Moreover, they will consider going to the UN Security Council to discuss Israel's membership in the United Nations, for its membership contravene to the international law. They, in addition, will go to the United Nations for the full membership of the State of Palestine, pointing out that the leadership is escalating the events in line with gradual, ground escalation. The international rejection of Trump's, he added, started to impose new effects that exceeded any agreements which were planned to become true on the passage of a final peace deal.

This decision caused the Palestinian street, with all of its factions, to move towards a third intifada unless the decision is reversed. It also led the Arab street to move and unite on a unanimous issue; and it let the Islamic world parties to focus more on the Palestinian cause and be a serious part from. It caused a state of international isolation of US policy, which found a wide World opposition as a result of its ill-calculated policies. This means that talking about a final deal in cooperation with Riyadh, Cairo and Abu Dhabi will lead to the formation of a regional alliance that includes Israel and will deal with Iranian expansion in the wind. This is a clear indication of Trump's failure to manage successful policies in the region as a result of its internal pressures.

Possible scenarios:

The first scenario: the failure of the deal and challenging the American vision

In this scenario, the parties continue to defy the American vision of resolving the Palestinian issue, in the light of the United States' insistence on adhering to the Trump decision on Jerusalem. Accordingly, it will remove trust from the United States as an intermediary, will stimulate the need for a new mediator, and will file a complaint against the United States in the Security Council. The United States will not be able to suspend this action even though it is a permanent member due an article that prevents a permanent member from objecting if the complaint is against him. The parties will resort to further

escalation as they talk about the intention of the Egyptian parliament to hold an important meeting, which may witness a strong parliamentary position. There is a call for a review of the peace agreement signed between the Arab Republic of Egypt and Israel, similar to the call of the Jordanian parliament which asked for a review of Wadi El- Araba deal. The Islamic countries will rise from their political movement to overturn the decision towards resolving the issue by finding a new mediator and by supporting the UN mechanisms to ensure the end of the occupation of the observer, the state of Palestine and upgrading its legal status to full membership to create a path beyond 23 years of futile negotiations.

The second scenario: the escalation and targeting the Palestinian leadership and putting pressure on the countries of the region

In this scenario, the United States will not accept a retreat from its decision, but is trying to launch a counter-attack on the Palestinian side by trying to block the Authority financially and pressure the Arab and Islamic countries to stop supporting the Palestinian position financially and politically. It will try to expand its attack by creating new events in the region to illustrate, by igniting the conflict with Iran through sparking the confrontation in more than one square, and perhaps with statements about Iran and its role in the region to appease Saudi Arabia, as well as statements against Qatar to appease Egypt. However, this scenario may face the insistence of the Islamic and popular Arab priority of Jerusalem on any other issue, especially as the rapprochement will increase between Turkey and Iran in the question of Palestine after they converged on the issues of Qatar and the Kurds of Iraq. That will make US pressure useless under the Islamic encroachment and international rejection of the decision Trump. The Arab regimes will not be able to overcome the mobility of the street in the context of its inability to pressure Trump to get back on his decision.

Scenario 3: Reversing the decision

In this scenario, the United States accepts the reversal of the decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and to transfer the US Embassy to Jerusalem.

That may happen, either explicitly or through a complementary procedure that empties the first recognition of its content; for example, Trump will declare the recognition by the US administration of East Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state or open an embassy to the Palestinian state in the Eastern Jerusalem. The United States then will offer its revised peace initiative to go beyond the Jerusalem hurdle, which has been opened early. Regional arrangements to complete the deal are the result of a US vision to resolve the Palestinian issue as a prelude to a coalition arrangement in the region that would address Iranian expansion and terrorist groups. It could find Palestinian and Arab acceptance if no impossible Israeli conditions are set, such as keeping Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and major settlement blocs under Israeli control. But this scenario will not be accepted by the American and Jewish parties that pushed for the decision to recognize and will work to hinder it and to consider what was recognized as a reality. It will call to deal with the initiative as it is in exchange for economic breakthrough and facilities. This may lead to an escalation in more than one arena. Gaza may be the closest on order to divert attention from the core issue to a secondary issue as a way out of the crisis, focusing on ending the war and establishing a new truce. Then the Palestinians will return to a new confrontation, or struggle for a one-state solution, or Israel will create a new leadership that accepts a low ceiling of Palestinian national demands.

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